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Emotions on Trial: Judging Crimes of
Honour in Post-Civil-War Greece
Efi Avdela
1 «Honour crime in Piraeus committed by soldier,» ran the title of a news story published
in an Athens morning newspaper on 21 September 1951. According to the report, on the
previous day, Panos Marmaris, a 22-year-old boilermaker doing his military service and a
resident of Itea (near Delphi), shot his fellow-townsman, Andreas Triandafyllou, aged 32,
at his kiosk in the Kaminia district of Piraeus. The perpetrator considered the victim the
«seducer» of his 19-year-old sister Maria, whom he had made pregnant and whom he
refused to marry. Marmaris, who had repeatedly tried to persuade the kiosk-owner to
change his mind, had travelled to Piraeus for yet another meeting «in order to settle the
difference between the two families,» which concerned «the contentious issue of  the
reinstatement of his relations […] with the perpetrator’s sister, who had given birth to
[the victim’s] child.» Faced with Triandafyllou’s categorical refusal and his provocative
behaviour, Marmaris, «beside himself,» killed him. When he was arrested, «he invoked
the usual reasons of honour,» while «he reproached the victim, to whose provocations he
attributed the tragedy that took place»2.
2 News items such as these are typical of 1950s Greece. Throughout that decade, but also
into the early sixties, Athenian newspapers carried a significant number of reports on
crimes (murders, injuries and attempted murders) committed «for reasons of honour,»
according  to  the  repeated,  stereotypical  wording.  This  is  a  particular  non-specific
category  of  acts  of  interpersonal  violence,  for  which  the  perpetrator  invokes  the
restitution of an insult against her/his family or individual honour, an insult which was
allegedly caused by the actions of the victim. In most cases, these actions revolve around
marriage and family, either as something anticipated or as something to be preserved3.
3 Of course, this was not a new phenomenon. As early as the 19th century, the insult to
one’s  «honour»  constituted  the  main  justification  for  the  commission  of  acts  of
interpersonal violence and this does not appear to change significantly during the first
half of the 20th century4. However, there are two features which distinguish the post-civil-
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war period. On the one hand, the acts of interpersonal violence which are termed, by
those  directly  involved,  «honour  crimes»  are  delimited  by  the  specific  meaning
mentioned  above.  On  the  other  hand,  at  this  time,  «honour  crimes»  dominated  an
unprecedented public debate. The debate extended beyond «honour crimes» to include
the more general  issue of  the management  of  interpersonal  violence,  the forms and
extent of which had been deeply marked by the previous ten years. The War, the German
occupation, and the Civil War had brought about, in the forties, a familiarisation with
violence which was visible in many aspects of everyday life for several years after the end
of the military conflicts5. In the early 1950s, the victors in the Civil War proceeded to
reinstate order.  This  was a conjuncture at  which public  opinion became increasingly
concerned with the «crime rate». Foreign anthropologists began pointing out for the first
time the meaning of social values such as «honour» in Greek society6 and the content of
this concept underwent a redefinition process. By the late 1960s this process had led to a
transformation and a delegitimisation of the meaning of «honour» which constitutes the
normative basis of honour crimes; i.e. the delegitimisation of the correlation between the
defence of the offended honour and interpersonal violence. The transformation of the
meaning of «honour,» which would lead to the abolition of «honour crimes,» by the end
of the 1960s, is linked to a broader concern over the character and the particular values
of Greek society during a period of rapid social change.
4 In this paper, I intend to focus on one of the dimensions of the study of «honour crimes»
in Greece during the fifties and sixties, and specifically on their judicial management. My
analysis will focus not only on the debate concerning the role of jurors in «honour crime»
trials, but also the administration of penal justice in general. I hope that this analysis will
show, through the case of Greece,  the ways in which the administration of justice is
subject to a particular conjuncture, i.e. that it is the result of changing perceptions and
cultural beliefs, and is therefore historically defined7.
 
Jurors and «the Public Feeling of Justice»
5 «Honour crimes» do not constitute a separate judicial category under the Greek Penal
Code8.  Related  cases  are  introduced  in  court  among  other  «crimes  against  life»
(homicides or attempted homicides or grievous bodily harm)9. The reference to «reasons
of  honour»  during  the  trial  is  significant  only  in  relation  to  the  (male  or  female)
perpetrator’s motives in that their acknowledgement can provide the defendant with
mitigating circumstances. In other words, in such cases the court is not called upon to
rule as to the perpetrator’s guilt with regard to the criminal act she or he has committed.
This is an accepted fact to which the defendant has confessed. What is at stake is the
motive – whether the invocation of the insult against one’s honour is valid.
6 In essence, the court is called upon to judge to what degree the (male or female) victim,
through her or his actions, offended the reputation of the perpetrator so as to provoke a
strong sense of shame and to impel her or him to violence. The judgment on this matter
is decisive in the outcome of the trial, since it influences the degree to which the court
takes  into  account  any  mitigating  circumstances,  especially  those  which  link  the
perpetrator’s  reputation to the intensity of  the emotional  disturbance caused by the
victim’s insult to her or his honour. The body that decides whether the perpetrator of an
«honour crime» is entitled to a more lenient sentence due to mitigating circumstances is
the jury. The court passes its sentence based on this jury verdict.
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7 The stance and the decisions of the jurors in «honour crime» cases were, during the fifties
and sixties, at the centre of intense discussion and controversy. The debate surrounding
this issue was expressed in court by public prosecutors as well as in the press, both in
daily  and  periodical  publications,  by  journalists,  commentators,  analysts  and  jurists.
Often, in fact, the problematic penal management of «honour crimes» was correlated to
the  supposedly  increasing  crime rate  in  Greek  society10 and the  inadequacies  of  the
system for the administration of justice.
8 These public interventions share a concern over the role of the jurors as representatives
of «accepted morals» and the sensus juris communis, «the public feeling of justice». That is
to say, to what extent,  through their verdicts in trials of «honour crimes,» do jurors
actually fulfil this role? For jurists, court officials, criminologists, journalists and analysts,
«honour crimes» and their penal management became a classic example of a field where
tradition and modernisation clashed, since they brought to the surface a critical question.
Had «accepted objective social morals» remained the same, or had they changed? Or,
even more significantly, were they in need of change?
9 Therefore, during the period under examination, the jury is at the centre of the criticism
aimed not only at the trying of «honour crimes,» but also at the workings of the penal
system in general. Public prosecutors, jurists and journalists accused juries of showing a
leniency which either no longer expressed «the public feeling of justice» or which did,
but as a symptom of retrogression and insufficient civilisation. It was no longer taken for
granted that perpetrators and jurors actually shared a common value system, or that they
perceived the meaning of honour in the same way. One no longer encountered statements
such as the one we come across in the periodical Noumas, in 1908: «Two terrible crimes in
a single week; a father killed his son and a brother killed his sister. Regarding the latter,
there is not much one can say. As terrible as it is, it also has its bright side, since it proves
that the feeling of family honour is still alive among the working classes, a feeling which
[…] remains sacrosanct to the Greek people and serves to conceal certain other flaws»11.
In the fifties and sixties, more and more voices saw precisely in this «feeling» one of the
most serious «flaws» of Greek society.
10 In  effect,  the  discussion  on  mitigating  circumstances  and  the  role  of  the  jurors
constituted the first time during the post-war period that the motive invoked by the
perpetrators of «honour crimes,» i.e. the insult and the emotional tension with which it is
perceived, was called into question. What was in fact called into question was one of the
main features of such cases - the victim’s responsibility for her or his fate. What was
contested was not only whether the perpetrator had the right to invoke offended honour
as a mitigating circumstance in regard to the criminal act, but more importantly, the very
emotion that the perpetrator put forward as her or his motive, i.e. the shame and turmoil
felt at the insult.
11 Within this context, the debate and public statements surrounding the role of the jury in
«honour crime» trials have two sides. The first concerns the legal structure of honour as
an emotion, intervening at the moment of the criminal act, and its evaluation by the jury
as a mitigating circumstance. The second refers to the correlation between the supposed
leniency of the jury and the workings of penal justice in the 1950s and the 1960s Greece.
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Emotions and Mitigating Circumstances
12 As in the case of Panos Marmaris, cited at the beginning of this paper, the perpetrator of
an «honour crime» (whether male or female) often invoked not only the insult caused by
the actions of the (male or female) victim over time, but also, and indeed primarily, the
loss of control caused by the victim’s conduct at the moment the incident took place: «I
was infuriated,» «the blood rushed to my head,» «I flew off the handle,» «I saw red,» and
«I was enraged,» were all common statements in the defendants’ pleas12. This sudden over
excitation of the perpetrator’s feelings was attributed to especially insulting gestures,
words  or  forms of  conduct  on the  part  of  the  victim at  the  precise  moment  of  the
incident.  These were presented as the culmination of a long process of insults which
transform the incident into an «honour crime». Exactly what provoked the emotional
reaction of the perpetrator each time varied according to the relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim and the history of their conflict.
13 More specifically, the momentary loss of control usually invoked by the perpetrators of
«honour crimes» to justify their act took on meaning – for the perpetrators themselves,
for the court, and for public opinion – only if seen in the light of history, i.e. over time.
Only  then did  it  become something beyond the  perpetrators’  control,  something for
which they were not responsible, and a loss of control which would not be likely to occur
outside the conditions of the particular event. The more protracted the dispute between
perpetrator and victim,  the more inevitable and therefore legitimate was the loss  of
control at the moment of the crime.
14 We  can  take  as  an  example  the  relationship  between  Periclis  Gravias,  his  daughter
Eleftheria and Iakovos Koumas. Gravias was a customs official, his daughter, Eleftheria, a
teacher, and Iakovos Koumas her fiancé, an officer and teacher who refused for seven
years to marry her. They were all residents of Athens. It is only in direct correlation to
the different phases of this long and turbulent relationship that one can understand the
intensity of the final scene, as described by the perpetrator in his plea. «Upon my refusal
[to allow his daughter to follow the victim], he [Koumas] said ‘I’m taking her with me.
Come on, Lela, let’s go,’ my daughter started to put on her coat, and then I flared up, I was
blinded, all I could see were stars and sunlight, I took the knife from the kitchen and I
stabbed him.» The court’s ruling, which acknowledged his state of «complete confusion»
and acquitted him, was based precisely on the long chain of events which led – justifiably,
according to the court – to the perpetrator’s losing control: the loss of control was only
the symptom13.
15 A similar case, also in Athens, was that of Stavros Kechriotis, a carpenter and real estate
agent, who killed his daughter Maria because she «led a dissolute life.» If the moment of
the  murder  could  be  justified  by  the  loss  of  control  brought  on  by  his  rage  at  her
behaviour  during their  argument,  his  extreme reaction could  only  be  understood in
relation to the details of his long-standing efforts to «steer her to the straight and narrow
path»: «On the day of the murder, her mother asked her for the keys to the shop and she
threw them at her, cursing her. I tried to reason with her, but she was cursing me and in
the end she threw the ashtray in my face. Beside myself with anger, I grabbed the gun and
killed her.» Based on the entire story, the court acknowledged that he was in a «fit of
rage» (se vrasmo psychikis  ormis),  accepted a plea of diminished responsibility and the
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mitigating circumstances of having been «driven by the inappropriate behaviour of the
victim,» and condemned him to five years and two months in prison14.
16 Thus, it becomes clear that in cases of «honour crimes» the jury was called upon to decide
to what extent the perpetrator was driven to commit the crime by the overall behaviour
of the victim which was offensive to her or his honour. That is to say, to what extent did
the  nature  of  the  victim’s  behaviour  provoke  in  the  perpetrator  such  intense  and
justifiable emotions that it was impossible for her/him to keep her/his temper and so, as
a result, she/he lost control of her/his actions and committed the crime? It concerns the
formulation  of  «mitigating  circumstances,»  the  acknowledgement  of  which  directly
influenced sentencing within the framework of  the margin provided by the law.  The
significance of  mitigating circumstances in the penal procedure means that the focal
point becomes the study of the personality of both perpetrator and victim, in order to
substantiate, on the one hand, the legitimacy of the former to invoke her/his offended
honour and, on the other, the responsibility of the latter for her/his fate.
17 During the period under examination,  penal  law distinguishes  between premeditated
homicide which is  punishable by life in prison or death,  and homicide «decided and
committed in a ‘fit of rage’,» which is punishable by imprisonment15. But what is this «fit
of rage» (vrasmos psychikis ormis) and how is it defined? One of the leading criminologists
of the time explained: «The ‘fit of rage’ is the sudden and abrupt overexcitement of one’s
emotions, such as anger, fear, self-esteem, jealousy, etc. There are various degrees of fits
of rage, but only the highest excludes liability […] A fit of rage (vrasmos psychikis ormis) is
distinguished from passion (pathos).  Passion is the powerful and continuous tendency
towards achieving a certain goal, e.g. the passion for revenge, the passion of ambition or
love. The existence of this passion as the cause of a certain act does not remove liability.
However, at a given moment, passion may drive the person possessed by it to a state of
furore which would exclude liability»16.
18 Thus, vrasmos psychikis ormis and pathos are both emotions, but different ones. In any
event, they both display gradations which determine the degree of liability of the person
acting under their  influence.  Therefore,  the intensity of  the emotion determines the
degree of the perpetrator’s responsibility, and, consequently, the severity of her or his
sentence.  Diminished  liability  or  the  lack  thereof,  complete  or  partial  confusion  of
consciousness are all provided for by the law. But how does one measure the intensity of
these emotions, and how does one distinguish between them? Who decides issues that
directly concern the perpetrator’s emotional state at the moment of the crime, and with
what qualifications?
19 In the European tradition of penal justice, as analysed by Michel Foucault, the move from
revenge  to  the  punishment  of  the  guilty  and,  subsequently,  from  the  crime  to  the
criminal is inseparably linked to the forming of new fields of power-knowledge, at the
centre  of  which lies  the  personality  of  the  perpetrator.  Criminologists,  psychiatrists,
coroners and all kinds of experts intervene in court and the «mitigating circumstances»
surrounding the sentence are based on their expert opinion of the perpetrator17. In the
Greek penal system, determining liability does not necessarily require the intervention of
a psychiatrist.  The court  decides  whether it  is  a  case of  a  fit  of  rage,  of  diminished
liability, or of a state of partial or complete confusion on the part of the perpetrator at
the moment of the crime. It is only in cases of a  diagnosed, severe mental disease, due to
which the perpetrator cannot be held liable, that the law provides that she or he be led to
a psychiatric institution rather than prison18. With the limited intervention of «experts»
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during the period under examination and consequently, with minimally developed fields
of «power-knowledge,» which elsewhere had been set up as early as the previous century,
the role of the jurors in the Greek penal system took on great importance. It was they
who  were  called  upon  to  assess  the  mitigating  circumstances  put  forward  by  the
perpetrator.
20 In  «honour  crimes,»  the  fit  of  rage  (vrasmos  psychikis  ormis)  is  the  first  mitigating
circumstance invoked by the  perpetrator  in  her  or  his  defence,  and it  refers  to  the
behaviour of the victim at the moment the act was committed. As the main mitigating
circumstance,  a fit  of  rage diminishes the sentence according to the intensity of  the
mental pressure (or the conscientious dilemma) experienced by the perpetrator. It refers
to the instantaneous nature of the murder which is identified with the violence itself of
the emotion contained in the fit  of  rage.  In an «honour crime,» murder is  emotion.
However, the insult which provokes this emotion, in most cases is not instantaneous but
works over time, protractedly, and that is why it is able to provoke a derangement of
consciousness, a state of complete or partial confusion. In this respect, «fit of rage» and
«confusion» refer to different temporalities of the «honour crime.»
21 The Penal Code provides further mitigating circumstances which concern not the act per
se, but the perpetrator. These include «a previously honest life,» «the non petty motives
of the act,» «improper behaviour on the part of the victim,» «rage or violent sorrow
caused by an unjustified attack,» «sincere remorse,» and «good behaviour following the
crime». Criminologists consider the nature of the mitigating circumstances listed in the
Penal Code to be indicative of the relationship between penal law and the perceptions
surrounding morality – they are constantly interacting. For example, «non petty motives
are those that do not go against the common conscience regarding morality or social
order», while «improper behaviour on the part of the victim» consists in the insult or
even the deriding, rude gesture that the victim makes towards the perpetrator, to which
the perpetrator reacts with the crime. All jurists agree that mitigating circumstances are
determined by diverse factors, such as «reasons of honour, local customs, the heat of
jealousy,  financial  misadventures,  respect,  mere  suggestion,  etc.,  and,  generally,  any
other circumstance related to the perpetrator’s personality»19. In a penal trial, therefore,
the court is called upon to rule on issues that do not refer simply to factual data in the
strict sense, but also to emotions, which are vaguely defined and fluid, or to social values
that  change over  time.  The court  is  called upon to make a  judgement based on the
«feeling  of  the  average  person,»  on  experience,  and  not  on  prescribed  scientific
knowledge. This applies even more so in the trial of an «honour crime,» for which the
perpetrator, from the outset, invokes powerful emotions, continuous or instantaneous,
which the court must assess based on an average experience with regard to perceptions
concerning  moral  order  and  with  regard  to  the  consequences  of  the  sudden  over
excitation of the emotions in the cases in which this order is disturbed.
22 According to the Preamble of the Act of the new Penal Code in 1950, penal law provided
Greece with «on the one hand, a renewal of the legal doctrine of our penal law according
to the findings of the modern penal justice. On the other, it satisfied the central demand
of contemporary anti-crime policy – the individualisation of the legal treatment of the
person who has committed the crime»20. In the text of the law, the modern developments
of jurisprudence are identified with the individualisation of the penal treatment of the
criminal.  Thus  we  can  claim  that  even  during  the  period  under  examination,  the
development of scientific knowledge and its interweaving with the penal system as a
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technology of power remained extremely limited in Greece. The judicial management of
«honour crimes» allows us to perceive a situation in which power individualises those
upon which it is exercised, without, however, becoming anonymous or functional or, at
least  in  this  field,  repressive21.  In  this  situation,  the  margins  for  contrasting
interpretations with tangible penal consequences prove to be significant. Apart from the
perpetrators and the victims as well as the witnesses for the defence and the prosecution,
an important factor at the level of interpretation is also the jury.
23 Seen in this light, it is also clear that those who invoked a «fit of rage» as a defence, took
it for granted that the police, the magistrate, the judges and the jurors understood what
was being talked about. This can be seen in the systematic and repeated invocation on the
part of the perpetrator of her or his unsettled emotional state at the time of the trial. It
can also be seen in the defence strategy that aims to secure the defendant the mitigating
circumstances  of  being  in  a  «fit  of  rage»  and  in  a  «partial»  or  «complete  state  of
confusion».  Thus  if  they  understood  and recognised  the  emotions  invoked  by  the
perpetrator,  they  also  recognised  the  situations  that  could  have  provoked  them  as
different forms of insult against one’s honour. An example would be the disputing of the
authority  of  the  male  leader  of  the  family  and  a  blow  to  the  public  image  of  the
perpetrator that this brought about in the examples mentioned above.
24 According to this rationale, the perpetrators of «honour crimes» and the juries that tried
them  shared  the  same  meaning  of  honour  and  this  common  cultural  system  often
supplanted other differences such as those of class or education. Even though all jurists
agreed that the law does not define what «honour»22 is, this common cultural premise,
which was viewed as «shared values,» was considered responsible for the jury’s leniency
in cases of «honour crimes.»
25 It is not possible to factually substantiate a charge against the jury for leniency, neither
generally nor specifically, in cases of «honour crimes.» Based on the information at our
disposal, we can perhaps claim that in the cases in which the jury’s verdict recognised a
complete or partial state of confusion on the part of the perpetrator as stemming from
the victim’s behaviour at the moment of the incident, the relative statements, as they
appeared in «penal issues»23,  were indicative of this shared  system of cultural values.
Guilty of intentional homicide committed in a fit of rage, was the jury’s decision in the
case  of  the  woman  farmer  who,  in  1952  murdered  her  fellow-villager  in  Frantzi,
prefecture of Fthiotida, because he had seduced her. The rationale of the jury was that «at
the  time  when  she  committed  the  above  act,  because  of  a  derangement  of  her
consciousness, due to rage, provoked in her by the insult to her honour by the victim, she
may not have fully lacked the ability to perceive the injustice of her action or to act
according to this perception, however her ability was significantly diminished as a result
of the above cause.» And the court issued a prison sentence of four and a half years24.
«Guilty of manslaughter […] but in a state of complete confusion,» was the jury’s verdict
in the case of Periklis Gravias. In 1953, in Nea Erythrea, he murdered his daughter’s fiancé
because for seven years he kept breaking his promise to marry her. Gravias was «enraged
by this behaviour of [the victim], by which yet another calamity was being forced upon
his family, which, from a moral standpoint, had collapsed to such a degree that he could
not distinguish the injustice of his action, and, being in such a mental state, he committed
the offence in question.» Based on this verdict, Gravias was «acquitted of any penalty»25.
Ioannis Niotis was found guilty of being «in a fit of rage because of the indignation caused
by the immoral  conduct  of  the victim and the abandoning on her part  of  her three
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underage children,» with the mitigating circumstances of «a previously honest private,
familial, professional and overall social life». In 1954, Niotis fatally wounded his sister in
Piraeus because she was «living a dissolute life».  He was sentenced to two years and
fifteen days in prison26. The verdict in the case of Antonia Matsidou, a cleaning woman,
was that she was guilty of intentional homicide with diminished liability,  «due to an
unhealthy derangement of her mental functions, due to stupidity,» with the mitigating
circumstances of a previously honest life and the fact that she showed «sincere remorse».
She «was prompted by the inappropriate behaviour of the victim and got carried away by
rage and violent sorrow, caused by an unjust act committed against her». In 1962 she
killed stretcher-carrier Nikos Kataras in Athens because he refused to marry her. She was
sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment27.
26 On the other hand, an overall - although impressionistic - view of the 1950s and 1960s
shows a decrease in verdicts citing a state of partial or complete confusion. There is also
an increase in maximum sentencing for the same crime and taking into account the same
mitigating circumstances provided by the law. Any leniency appears to be giving way to
increasing severity in the enforcement of the law. However, it remains extremely difficult
to substantiate a  convincing assessment of  the treatment received in court  by those
accused of «honour crimes». The difficulty of clearly defining the role of the jurors is due
to a variety of factors. The main one has to do with the principle of individualising the
sentence provided by the law which bases the apportionment of the sentence on the
specific data of a case in such a way that no case is like another28.
27 In  fact  the  matter  is  quite  irrelevant.  The  way  in  which  jurors  were  perceived  by
journalists, analysts and judges had very little to do with their actual severity or leniency,
no matter what our difficulties in assessing it. The fact that their attitude became, during
the period under investigation, the subject of public debate is more than anything else
indicative of the cultural transformation that is characteristic of the time. In the juridical
domain, this cultural transformation took the form of the break with the consensus that
jurors were by definition representative of sensus juris communis. The question as to what
extent perpetrators and jurors shared common values and recognised common emotions
lay at the centre of this debate. Not only this common ground was not considered self-
evident any more, but the question was raised as to whether it was in fact desirable for
securing the public  feeling of  justice and the public’s  confidence in penal  justice;  or
furthermore, whether this common ground could ever exist.During the period we are
studying (unlike previous ones), commentaries never congratulated the jurors on their
decisions regarding «honour crimes» or encouraged them to continue to deal justly with
the social problems to which these crimes were linked. «Certainly above all approbation
is the pardon given to Kalli Vlastari of Kythnos, accused of murdering the traitorous lover
who abandoned her. Bearing in mind the moral depravity of certain vile individuals who
systematically and premeditatedly destroy the reputation of honourable families and the
lives and happiness of innocent, unfortunate beings, the jury, through its acquittal of the
unfortunate Kalli, has struck a blow against this gang of cowards,» wrote Kallirroi Parren
in 188829.  Conversely,  during the next  century,  in the fifties  and sixties,  jurors  were
systematically blamed for everything that was wrong with penal justice.
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The Jury on Trial
28 Initially, criticism originated from legal circles. Public prosecutors addressed the court in
cases of «honour crimes;» penal law experts commented on the inadequacies of penal
justice  and proposed  measures  for  dealing  with  them and criminologists  sought  the
preconditions  that  would  improve  the  situation.  «There  is  something  rotten.  The
constantly invoked reasons of honour carry a lot of weight here. When trying a crime
committed for reasons of honour, the hearts of the gentlemen of the jury become soft,
and are transformed into honey,» stated public prosecutor Rakopoulos at the trial of the
Lakopoulos brothers from the village of Sagiades, prefecture of Arta. In 1954 the brothers
killed a fellow-villager because he would not agree to marry their sister whom he had
seduced. The journalist following the trial described the public prosecutor’s statement as
a «momentous event,» and a «relentless indictment brought on by the recently observed
tendency of juries to acquit the defendants»30.
29 During the same year, the workings of trials by jury and the verdicts of the jurors in cases
of  «honour  crimes»  had  come  to  the  fore  for  the  added  reason  of  the  legislative
adjustment giving women the right  to participate in juries.  This  adjustment was the
logical, albeit delayed, consequence of the bestowing of political rights upon women in
1952,  as  well  as  of  the  ratification  by  the  Greek  parliament  of  the  international
convention «concerning the political rights of women,» in 1953. The prospect and the
elaboration of the adjustment caused strong reactions on the part of the Bar and the
judiciary31.
30 The central question concerned the ability of women to distinguish between pity and
justice. The judges maintained that criminal courts try crimes «which demand that the
person judging be isolated from the sensitive  chords of  human pity  as  well  as  from
indecision». According to the public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal, «we fear
that perhaps woman, […] created by nature with more sensitivity, as we believe, than
man, will not be able to face, with the same realism as he, the need to punish a crime
with, at times, a harsh sentence. Besides, the statistics of the verdicts of criminal courts
under  the  present  composition  of  the  juries  proves  that  this  institution  is,  if  not
bankrupt,  certainly not successful  with regard to the intentions of  the constitutional
legislator, since, as a rule, the jury’s verdicts are extremely lenient and not equal to the
severity  of  the  committed  crime,  while  sometimes  acquitting  the  defendant
unjustifiably.» The participation of women risked rendering the institution «even more
vulnerable»32.
31 The  issue  then  concerned  the  relation  of  each  sex  to  emotions.  But  it  also  equally
concerned the contrasting of emotion with reason – the reason of jurisprudence, not of
«common sense». For if women were considered emotional by nature, then male jurors
were also accused of getting carried away by their emotions. «It is usually said that jurors
get carried away by their emotions and that the result of this is the leniency that they
display which constitutes a vulnerable spot in the institution of the jury»33. Those who
claimed  that  the  innate  emotionality  of  women  would  reinforce  the  unacceptable
leniency of juries were countered by different arguments within the framework of the
same common acceptance. For Aglaia Tsitsoura, one of the first women criminologists,
the answer was defined by two obvious givens. On the one hand women do indeed have a
more developed emotional world because of their maternal instinct, and on the other, the
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jury expresses the «popular conscience». It is inferred therefore that «since […] the jury’s
verdict expresses the subjective judgment of the representatives of the Greek people, it is
not  only advisable but  also necessary for  women to participate in juries,»  since this
guaranteed the representation of the perceptions and emotions of the entire population
and not only of men34.
32 The need for women’s emotions and values to be represented on juries was implied by the
introductory report to the relevant legislative decree. «In the case of especially heinous
crimes,  it  can be said that a woman’s judgment will  be more objective and fair,  and
offences such as the insulted honour of an uncle or male cousin (…!) [sic] will,  in the
person of a female juror, meet with a fairer penal treatment and retribution»35.  In an
official  text,  the  correlation  between female  jurors  and  «honour  crime»  trials  made
highly  controversial  issues  appear  as  common  acceptances:  that  the  invocation  of
«reasons of honour» in felony crimes could not be accepted; that «honour crimes» were
directed primarily against women; and that male jurors did not actually possess sounder
judgment than women, who were able to judge equally, if not more objectively36.
33 The  participation  of  women  on  a  jury  (three  out  of  ten)  was  considered  generally
successful,  even  though  accusations  of  inadmissible  leniency  on  the  part  of  juries
continued unabated37.  Indeed, in 1960,  a penal law expert claimed that thanks to the
improved composition of juries and the participation of women, «the spirit of leniency
which prevailed in the past in the case of ‘honour crimes’ has finally been limited». Thus,
«the time when such verdicts were issued,  as once occurred in my birthplace,  Crete,
where a man who murdered his mother-in-law for reasons of ‘honour’ was acquitted by
the Criminal Court, belongs irrevocably to the past!»38.
34 Nevertheless, most of his colleagues as well as other social commentators were still a long
way from sharing this view until the late 1960s. They did not tire of repeating that juries
showed inadmissible leniency towards criminals, causing the reaction of public opinion.
35 Certain  jurists  correlated  the  problem  with  the  general  application  of  mitigating
circumstances provided by the law in the case of homicides, which «constitutes a danger
of issuing inadmissibly lenient verdicts». More serious misunderstandings were caused by
mitigating  circumstances  concerning  «a  fit  of  rage,»  «non  petty  motives»  and  the
«inappropriate behaviour of the victim» because «the jurors think that these concepts (fit
of rage, non petty motives, an honourable life, etc.) are sufficiently clear and that any
explanation is considered superfluous,  if  not suspect and misleading»39.  For the same
reason,  a  lack  of  restraint  was  observed  in  the  application  of  the  «state  of  partial
confusion». However, it was emphasised that these concepts were extremely complex and
that the emotions they referred to were especially difficult to understand in their correct
intensity and meaning by non-experts. And since the jurors were insufficiently prepared
to scientifically comprehend the meaning of mitigating circumstances, they interpreted
them  according  to  their  current  meaning,  resulting  in  their  scandalously  lenient
decisions. The jurors’ «lack of restraint» was such, certain jurists claimed, that it went
against  «the public  feeling of  justice»40.  The reality  of  this  public  feeling concerning
justice was, of course, much more complicated in such a period of intense social and
political unrest.
36 «Honour crime» trials were systematically cited as proof of jurors’ inadmissible leniency.
Each new crime or trial brought on a flood of commentaries and analyses. Well-known
commentators and columnists repeatedly criticized the institution of the jury, and they
were often provoked by the verdicts of juries in cases of «honour crimes». One example is
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the Mayer Street crime in 1960, in which carpenter Nikolaos Kakouris killed his sister, her
boyfriend and his  mother  because  the  young man and his  mother  reneged on their
promise of marriage given to the young woman’s family.  Commenting on this crime,
sociologist,  journalist  and  social  commentator  Theophylaktos  Papakonstantinou
described the perpetrator as «primitive, incapable of feeling pity, incapable of resisting
the wind of insanity blowing in his home, and influenced by his immediate and greater
environment.»  «Jury  decisions  usually  encourage  these  types,  because  there  is  no
awareness yet in this country that so-called ‘honour crimes’ are the most dishonourable
of crimes»41.
37 Theophylaktos Papakonstantinou systematically kept returning to the issue.  A typical
case of an organic intellectual of that period and a representative of the authoritarian
modernisation that marked it, his regular attacks (as those of several jurists of the time)
often targeted the jury system, i.e. the participation of jurors as representatives of the
people. Even though it was never mentioned by name, the relatively recent experience of
the popular justice of the 1940s emerges between the lines of his writings as the extreme
version of the system he is denouncing42.
38 Papakonstantinou  believed  that  the  «lack  of  restraint»  of  the  jurors  blatantly
contradicted the state policy against criminality. Not only were the sentences provided by
the law for certain crimes already lenient; not only were these lenient sentences never
served to term; but those who decided on a defendant’s guilt  and sentence were the
jurors, thus making their role more decisive than that of the judges43.
39 A steady motif throughout this period is the correlation between the leniency the jurors
were accused of showing in cases of «honour crimes» and the spread of criminality. It is
precisely  upon  this  correlation  that  the  public  defender  Rakopoulos  based  his
denunciation in 1955 of the emotionality of the jurors in cases of «honour crimes», which
we saw above. «The enormous spread of crime in Greece in recent times is an extremely
disconcerting phenomenon. Where are we going, Gentlemen of the jury? Have you ever
examined this issue, will you examine it or will you limit yourselves simply to seeking out
mitigating circumstances? If we continue in this way, people will soon be committing
murder in Stadiou Street44. On the whole, jurors take the line of acquitting defendants»45.
40 The issue was seen to preoccupy public opinion and in any event it appeared repeatedly
in the press. In 1954, it also caused the intervention of the Minister of Justice Kleanthis
Theophanopoulos,  who  issued  a  circular  to  the  presiding  judges  and  the  public
prosecutors of the courts of appeal and the courts of misdemeanours advising them to
pass  harsher  sentences  on  criminals  and  to  take  measures  to  have  heinous  crimes
brought  to  court46.  Similar  actions  were  carried out  by  the  Minister  of  Justice
Konstantinos Kallias, in 196147.
41 In these interventions it was acknowledged that the issue of the jury was not just a Greek
problem, but was also to be found in many European states.  Given the constitutional
guarantee of the institution, changes were not possible without a constitutional revision.
However,  the  proposal  that  met  with  the  greatest  acceptance  was  the  one  that
underscored the need for the system to be transformed from a jury system to a mixed
jury and judge system. That is to say, the body called upon to reach a verdict concerning
the guilt or innocence of the perpetrator was not to be made up solely of jurors, but
judges were also to participate in it48. The times were considered ripe, especially when a
popular magazine of that period clearly expressed the view that the institution of the jury
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was «a useless, romantic relic of the supposedly democratic need for the people to be
represented in the administration of justice»49.
42 The proposal  to replace the jury system with a mixed one was supported mainly by
members of the judiciary and was discussed regularly at the conferences and the plenary
sessions of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The plenary session of 1961, for example, noted
that the recognition that «the jury system did not satisfy the public feeling of justice»
emerged as early as 1937 without, however, convincing the members of Parliament to
introduce its reform into the Constitution of 1952. In the opinion of the judges, «criticism
of  juries»  was  justified mainly  «because  of  the  inordinate  leniency which the  jurors
display in the assessment of  blame of  the individual  they have termed as  the guilty
defendant». The members of the jury «never cease to seek everywhere and always find
mitigating circumstances, justifying a diminished sentence even in cases where, given the
facts and the court hearing, this is unforgivable». A graver consequence was the fact that
«this […] strongly cultivates a tendency towards self-redress, which is the number one
enemy of law and order»50.
43 If  the main enemy of law and order is self-redress, then «honour crimes,» which are
above  all  acts  of  self-redress,  should  be  handled  with  great  severity.  There  was  a
unanimous admission that the trial of similar crimes revealed the inefficiencies of the
jury  system in  all  their  glory.  Consequently,  the  main  method  of  dealing  with  this
phenomenon became,  in  the  1960s,  the  systematic  contestation of  the  perception of
honour on which these crimes were based and of the common cultural base which linked
the perpetrators to the jurors that judged them.
44 This is what T. Papakonstantinou attempted to do when, in 1960, he denounced «the
unacceptable, selfish mentality of men» which is responsible for «honour crimes» and
demanded that the penalties for such crimes became more severe51. As we have seen, he
was not the only one to establish a negative correlation between «honour crimes» and
«male-dominated perceptions». However, a more categorical answer was given by Ioannis
Anastasiadis, a neurologist and psychiatrist, to a question by Lena Doukidou, the young
journalist of Ikones magazine, in 1964: «Recognising as a man’s right and as a mitigating
circumstance to commit murder in such cases [i.e. «honour crimes»], merely expresses
the  weaker  position of  woman in  our  society.  (And even when the  perpetrator  is  a
woman, again this kind of crime usually expresses her subordinate position. A woman
kills when somebody takes away her ‘honour’ and does not marry her - ‘honour’ in the
sense that has been imposed by male-dominated perceptions). [...] The acknowledgement
of mitigating circumstances in murders committed ‘for reasons of honour’ constitutes a
corroboration of the fact that we still live in the world of men and indeed in conditions
that are accepted by women too. Women themselves, after all, are the main obstacle to
their liberation»52.  At that point, the strong emotional reaction to the victim’s insults
invoked by the perpetrator of an «honour crime» to justify her or his action had already
lost its legitimacy. Moreover, the common value system that made this reaction and its
consequences  comprehensible  to  the  perpetrator’s  social environment,  to  the
newspapers’ readers, to the court that tried it, and indeed to the jury, was altogether
invalidated and denied.
45 As we have seen, the contestation of the logic upon which «honour crimes» were based
implied the contestation of  the emotions which,  according to the perpetrators,  were
caused by the insult to their honour and which were registered in the violence of their
reactions. It also implied the contestation of, or at least the invalidation of the common
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value system which linked the perpetrator of an «honour crime» to the jury that tried it.
It called, therefore, for a change in the «emotional regime» of social and gender relations
in a way that juxtaposed emotions and reason; violence and law. It referred, in other
words, to a policy of emotion management53.
46 This procedure reached its peak during the sixties. It was primarily expressed in public
discourse contesting, all the more frequently and explicitly, the meaning of the honour
that was related to the homonymous crimes. It was a discourse that challenged tradition
but it was authoritarian with regard to the modernisation it professed, which aimed at
constituting new disciplines  and at  regulating  social  relations  «from above.»  In  that
sense, it registered with clarity the circumstances of the post-civil-war period. However,
the sixties were not only marked by a planned effort to change perceptions which were
considered obsolete. They were also accompanied by a distinct decrease in those acts of
interpersonal  violence for which the perpetrators invoked «reasons of  honour.» New
forms of  interpersonal  violence made their  appearance and began to  spread,  mainly
between strangers, while, all the more frequently, alternative measures to violence were
chosen in dealing with instances perceived as slights  of  honour,  such as  recourse to
justice. Discourse and practice were then – as they always are – indissolubly connected
and constantly in the process of interaction.
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Εγκληματολογικής, έτους 1961 [Statistics of Justice, Political Justice and Criminological, year 1961],
Athens, National Printing House, 1964.
Foucault, M., Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.
Fronimos, E., ΤαΚακουργιοδικείαμας [Our Criminal Courts], Ποινικα◌́Χρονικα◌́ [Penal Chronicles],
1960, X, p. 62.
Gallant, T., Murder in a Mediterranean City: Homicide Trends in Athens, 1850-1936, Journal of the
Hellenic Diaspora, 1997, 23, 2, pp. 9-11.
Gallant, T.W., Honor, Masculinity, and Ritual Knife Fighting in Nineteenth-Century Greece, The
American Historical Review, 2000, 105, 2, pp. 359-382.
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Papakonstantinou, T., Η σκληρότης απέναντι της Ελληνίδος [Cruelty Towards the Greek Woman], 
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και πίσω απ ◌̓ τους αριθμούς [The Truth About Criminality in Greece. Beyond Impressions and
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[Images], 1962, 369, pp. 26-29.
Papakonstantinou, T., … Εξαιτι ́ωνμηταπεινών! [... Due to Non Petty Motives!], Εικόνες [Images],
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Εικόνες [Images], 1965b, 512, pp. 26-27.
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NOTES
2. Kathimerini, 21/9/1951, p. 4 and 22/9/1951, p. 4.
3. For more on this matter see Avdela 2002a and Avdela 2002b. It should be noted, however, that
in the case of Greece, so-called «honour crimes» differ greatly from the violent clashes caused by
the  competitiveness  of  manhood  which,  in  numerous  cultures,  is  linked  to  the  «worship  of
masculinity.» Thus, they do not include the popular forms of «honour contests,» such as the
verbal insults that result in brawls, arguments and stabbings, which take place in specific places
of entertainment or in the neighbouring public streets and are accompanied by the consumption
of alcohol. During the period we are studying, these brawls are not termed «honour crimes» by
anyone. See, among others, Gallant, 2000; Spierenburg, 1998; Boschi, 1998; Johnson, 1998. In the
case of Greece, «honour crimes» are also completely different from «vendettas,» even though it
is  not  rare  for  the  perpetrator  of  a  crime which concerns  a  vendetta  to  invoke «reasons  of
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honour» with a view to greater leniency on the part of the jury. See Makris,  1992. Since the
«honour crimes» mentioned here are those which are declared as such, our approach is also
different to the one chosen by Smith 2004. Of interest are the similarities but also the differences
with the case of Brazil, as it emerges in Caulfield, 2000.
4. Gallant, 1997; Kopsida-Vrettou, 1998.
5. For more on the period, see Close, 1993; Mazower, 1993.
6. It  is well  known that Greece constitutes one of the research fields for the anthropological
elaboration of the concept of «honour» as an organising principle of social relations, which was
long  considered  a  typical  feature  of  «Mediterranean societies.»  One  of  the  first  and  leading
studies  to  underscore  the  social  and  political  significance  of  «honour»  was  carried  out  by
Campbell,  1964,  who  researched  the  Sarakatsani,  a  nomadic  mountain  community  of  Epirus
between 1954-1955. See also Avdela, 2002b.
7. The material used in this paper draws from the sources of Avdela, 2002b. They include four
daily newspapers of Athens, court records from seven different regions of the country, and an
extended number of contemporary publications, including the legal press, other periodicals as
well as anthropological and sociological studies on Greek society. Court records have not been
systematically preserved in Greece. Those from Athens, Amfissa, Piraeus and Chalkida for the
period 1940-1970 are kept in the Central Service of the National Archives of the State, in Athens.
All others from the same period are to be found in the archives of the local Courts of Appeal and
their  preservation is  contingent on the space available.  Here the records from the courts  of
appeals of Thessaloniki, Patras and Chania have also been used.
8. This does not apply only to the post-war Penal Code (henceforth: PC) but also to the previous
ones. The new PC was ratified by Law 1492/17/7.8.1950 and was enforced in January 1951. See
Anagnostopoulos, Vathiotis 2001, pp. XXXVII-XCIV.
9. Crimes against life, which are felonies, i.e. homicide, attempted homicide and bodily harm,
were tried, at that time, in specific felony courts, called Kakourgiodikeia. See Papageorgiou, 1988.
10. As will become clear later in this paper, the constantly recurring argument in the fifties that
the crime rate in Greece was increasing was not  substantiated by statistical  evidence.  Crime
statistics for the years 1957-1958 and 1961, the only available for the period under investigation,
show a rather stable rate of homicides of all kinds and a slight decrease in cases of bodily harm.
See ESYE, 1961, 1964. At the turn of the decade commentators note that the period is marked
more by a qualitative diversification of crimes committed than by an increase in the crime rate.
For more on the matter, Avdela, 1992b, pp. 184-200.
11. T[angopoulos] 1906.
12. Respectively: Kathimerini 22.11.50, p. 3; Vradyni 21.3.58, p. 6; Kathimerini 3.5.60, pp. 7-8; Vradyni
19.2.58,  p.  8;  Vradyni  24.2.56,  p.  6;  Vradyni  21.11.59,  p.  6.  In  regard  to  the  invocation  of
«momentary insanity» in cases of homicide attributed to extreme feelings of humiliation, as in
the case of violent acts by men and women, see Harris, 1989, as mentioned by Reddy, 1997, p. 238.
Also, different essays in Johnson, Lipsett-Rivera, 1998, as well as Shapiro, 1996 and Polk, 1994.
13. General  State  Archives  (henceforth:  GSA),  Court  Archives,  Athens  Mixed  Jury  and  Judge
Court, Athens Assessors’ Records and Judgements (henceforth: Athens Assessors), vol. 56 (1953),
No. 43a, 44, 45, 46 / 23-29.11.1953.
14. GSA, Court Archives,  Piraeus Mixed Jury and Judge Court,  Piraeus Assessors’  Records and
Judgements (henceforth: Piraeus Assessors), vol. 61 (1955), No. 38, 39 / 24-25.10.1955.
15. PC  1950:  article  299.  Concerning  the  length  of  temporary  imprisonment  (five  to  twenty
years), see article 52. Through this differentiation, the new PC replaced the distinction between
murder and manslaughter provided for in the old one. For the old PC, see Malagardis, 1926. For
the new PC, see Vavaretos, 1956.
16. Vavaretos, 1956, p. 53. See also «Introductory Report to the Bill placing the Penal Code into
effect,» inVavaretos, 1969.
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17. Foucault, 1975.
18. Gardikas,  1951,  pp.  18-20.  PC,  article  36,  37.  According  to  the  PC,  a  medical  opinion  is
necessary only in cases of a complete lack of liability. Diminished liability is not an acquittal but a
guilty verdict with mitigating circumstances; the same applies to a state of confusion, which falls
under diminished liability. So unusual was the presence of psychiatrists in Greek courts, that
when in the mid sixties trials for murders with intent between strangers began to multiply and
the first trials of «ogres» – whom the defence presented as «psychopaths» – began to take place,
the  reaction  of  both  the  public  and  the  press  was  often  particularly  intense.  See
Papakonstantinou, 1965b and Kalamaras, 1965.
19. For  mitigating  circumstances,  see  article  84  PC,  par.  1  and  2.  The  quotations  are  from
Kondaxis, 1991, pp. 763-767. The interpretative wording concerning mitigating circumstances is
identical in Tousis, Georgiou, 1967, pp. 266-268.
20. Vavaretos, 1969, p. 3.
21. Obviously, the state of the dispensing of penal justice cannot be separated from the political
repression of the time which often took on the form of penal punishment.
22. For analyses of honour from the viewpoint of Greek jurisprudence of the time, see Avdela,
2002b, ch. 4.
23. «Penal issues» is the name given to the questions posed to the jurors during a penal trial and
to which they are asked to answer «yes» or «no.» The defence as well as the public prosecutor,
but also the civil prosecution had a say in the way they were worded, while the responsibility
rested with the judges.
24. GSA, Court Records,  Amfissa Mixed Jury and Judge Court,  Amfissa Assessors Records and
Judgements, vol. 29 (1952), No. 14, 15 / 8.10.1952
25. GSA, Athens Assessors, vol. 56 (1953), No. 43, 44, 45, 46 / 23-29.11.1953.
26. GSA, Athens Assessors, vol. 58 (1954), No. 10, 11, 12 / 5.11.1954.
27. GSA, Athens Assessors, vol. 75 (1963), No. 31, 32, 33, 34 / 16-17.5.1963.
28. Other parameters which refer to the penal procedure itself mitigate the responsibility of the
jurors and do not allow us to express a substantiated opinion on the degree of the jurors’ severity
or leniency in «honour crime» trials. Firstly, the jury’s verdict consists of their acceptance or
rejection of the so-called «penal issues,» i.e. the questions that are directed at them and which
are formulated by a collaboration of the prosecution and the defence according to the specifics of
the case, and to which questions the jury must reply «yes» or «no.» Secondly, the sentence that
corresponds to the jury’s verdict is determined by the judges within the framework of the very
wide margins provided by the law; indeed, certain jurists believed that the margin of penalties
for each offence in Greek penal law was so wide that the apportionment of a sentence ultimately
became a subjective matter for the judges. Thirdly, the public prosecutor always has the option
of requesting that the judges declare a jury’s verdict «misled,» and during the period we are
examining this was exercised quite often, even though it did not always have the result desired
by the public prosecutor. For cases in which the jury’s verdict was declared «misled,» see GSA,
Athens Assessors, vol. 39 (1950), No. 19, 20 / 11.2.1950; Kathimerini 23.4.53, p. 6; Vradyni 28.10.58,
p. 6; Kathimerini 24.1.67, p. 10. For cases in which the relevant proposal of the public prosecutor’s
was overruled by the judges, see GSA, Athens Assessors, vol. 40 (1950), No. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 /
13-14.4.1950;  GSA,  Athens  Assessors,  vol.  56  (1953),  No.  43a,  44,  45,  46  /  23-29.11.1953;  GSA,
Athens Assessors, vol. 59 (1955), No. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 / 24.1.-8.2.1955; Patras Court
of Appeals Archive (henceforth PCAA), Patras Assessors’ Records and Judgements (henceforth:
Patras Assessors), year 1956, No. 88, 89, 90, 91 / 22-23.9.1956. For the only case found in which the
proposal to declare the verdict «misled» came from the counsel for the defence, see GSA, Patras
Assessors,  year  1963,  No.  73,  74,  75,  76  /  21-23.1.1963  (concerning  the  sentencing  of  the
perpetrator’s wife for collusion).
29. Ephemeris ton Kyrion [Ladies’ Journal], 66, pp. 6-7; also [Parren] 1888.
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30. Vradyni, 18.2.1955, p. 5.
31. This was Legislative Decree 3075/6/9.10.54 «on amending and supplementing codified Law
5026 ‘on Criminal Court’», in force as of 1.1.55. After the passing of the Law granting women the
right to vote, representatives of women’s associations presented a memorandum in which they
asked for the lifting of the restrictions which were based on women’s lack of political rights. One
of these restrictions prohibited women from participating in juries. The Bar Association and the
General Attorney interceded in the relevant discussion caused by this demand on the part of
women’s associations. See the relevant news reports in Kathimerini:  27.2.53, p. 4; 24.5.53, p. 6;
13.5.53, p. 4; 13.8.54, p. 6; 26.9.54, p. 7. For the conjuncture in relation to women’s political rights,
see Avdela, 1990.
32. Kathimerini, 26.9.1954, p. 7.
33. Tsitsoura, 1954, p.101.
34. Tsitsoura, 1954, p. 104.
35. Randos, 1960, p. 639.
36. It should be emphasised that in the case of Greece, women were not the principal victims of
«honour crimes,» despite the fact that the opposite was a common occurrence in the 1960s, as
shown by the references below. See Avdela, 2002a. However, it is important to stress that in the
conjuncture of the time, the acknowledgement that women possess sound judgement did not
lead to the contestation of male authority in the family: it co-existed with its enactment by the
new civil code of 1946. The granting of equal political rights to women in 1952 and 1953, from
which the discussion regarding women jurors originated, did not imply equal civil or social rights
as well. See Avdela, 2005.
37. This latter assessment was expressed unanimously at Greece’s annual Courts of Appeal Public
Prosecutors conference, under the presidency of the Minister of Justice, K. Kallias, on 19 and 20
June, 1961 (Kallias, 1961, p. 15).
38. Fronimos, 1960, p. 62.
39. Patakias, 1959, p. 493.
40. Papakonstantinou, 1964a. Papakonstantinou, 1960b.
41. With regard to the same crime, see Palaiologos, 1975, pp. 131-133, 134-136, 137-139, which
includes  a  collection  of  the  columns  written  for  To  Vima daily  newspaper  by  well-known
journalist  Pavlos  Palaiologos.  For  other  cases  of  «honour  crimes»  which  gave  rise  to  social
analyses, see Papakonstantinou, 1959 and Papakonstantinou 1965a, as well as Palaiologos, 1975,
p. 110-112, 122-124, 125-127.
42. During the German occupation of Greece between 1941 and 1944, in the – mostly rural and
mountainous – areas that were placed gradually under the authority of the left-wing National
Liberation Front, a system of «popular justice» was instituted, where differences, grievances and
litigation were settled by the village general assembly. The functioning of this «popular justice»
system, especially during the Civil War of 1946-1949, was considered by the right-wing winners of
the war as an indicator of social anarchy and as responsible for crimes against «the nation». See
Mazower, 1993.
43. Papakonstantinou 1957a; 1957b; 1960c; 1961; 1964a; 1964b.
44. One of the major streets crossing central Athens.
45. Vradyni, 18.2.1955, p. 5.
46. Kathimerini: 9.6.1954, p. 5; 4.11.1954, p. 5; 7.11.1954, p. 8.
47. Kathimerini, 29.3.1961, p. 3; Kallias, 1961.
48. Stathatos, 1961; Kallias, 1961, pp. 13, 15, 24-33; Yiotis, 1962, p. 24.
49. Papakonstantinou, 1962.
50. Kallias, 1961, p. 15. For the restriction of the role of the jurors to be enforced, the judiciary
had to wait until the dictatorship of 21 April 1967: one of its first acts was to convert the jury
system of penal justice into a mixed jury and judge court (Papageorgiou, 1988).
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53. The term «emotional regime» belongs to Reddy, 2001, pp. 111-132. See also Bourke, 2003.
ABSTRACTS
The 1950s in Greece were marked by a rash of «honour crimes» and by an extensive public debate
on  their  penal  management.  The  public  interventions  revolved  around  the  emotions  of  the
perpetrators and the jurors and had two aspects. One concerned the legal structure of honour as
an emotion, described as intervening at the moment of the criminal act, and its assessment by
the jury as a mitigating circumstance. The second referred to the emotions expressed by the
jurors through their verdicts and explored to what degree these registered the existence of a
cultural  value  system  shared  by  the  perpetrators  and  the  jurors  judging  them.  The  much-
discussed leniency which was systematically  attributed to the jurors trying «honour crimes»
gradually led, in the 1960s, to the contestation of the jury system of penal justice.
En Grèce, les années 1950 furent marquées par une vague de « crimes d’honneur » et par un large
débat  public  concernant  leur  traitement  pénal.  Les  interventions  publiques  touchaient  aux
émotions des auteurs et des jurés et comportaient deux aspects: le premier visait le caractère
juridique de l’honneur comme émotion intervenant lors du passage à l’acte, et son appréciation
en tant que circonstance atténuante, par le jury; le second renvoyait aux émotions exprimées par
les jurés dans leur verdict et au point de savoir dans quelle mesure ce dernier traduisait  un
système de valeurs et une culture commune aux auteurs et aux jurés chargés de les juger. Le
laxisme  systématiquement  attribué  aux  jurés  dans  ces  procès  conduisit  graduellement  à  la
remise en cause de l’existence du jury criminel, dans les années 1960.
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